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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the
death penalty, a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and
mandatory LWOP for homicide convictions violate the Eighth Amendment
in the cases of juvenile defendants.' These decisions were premised, in
large part, on findings that "developments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds,"2 and that those findings both lessened a child's "moral culpability"
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological
development occurs, his "deficiencies will be reformed."3
The Court's rulings in these cases-Roper, Graham, and Miller-
have, by and large, been welcomed by juvenile justice advocates4 as "game-
changing" landmarks,' and as reflecting "a positive result for juvenile
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (ruling on mandatory life without parole for
homicide); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (ruling on life without parole for crimes
other than homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) (ruling on the death penalty).
2. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; see, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the
Intersection of Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 83 (2013) ("[J]uveniles rely on areas of
the brain ... associated with risky behavior"). Scholars are preliminarily considering the implications of
neuroscientific developments on these questions. See, e.g., Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between
Law and Neuroscience: Modern Brain Science, Media Influences, and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L.
REv. 695, 737 (2005). Language such as that used by the Supreme Court in these decisions has led one
commentator to characterize the Court's approach as evidencing a "tectonic shift" in its juvenile
criminal justice jurisprudence. See Michael Anderson, The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile LWOP:
Applying the Tison Standard to Juvenile Peripheral Accomplices, Miss. L.J. (forthcoming
2013); Robert G. Schwartz, Age-Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27 CRIM. JUST., no. 3, 2012 at
49, 49; see also Warren Binford, Criminal Capacity and the Teenage Brain: Insights from Neurological
Research, 14 DYNAMICS OF YOUTH JUST. & THE CONVENTION ON THE RTS. OF CHILD IN S. AFR. (Dec.
2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=2209505; Sean C. McGarvey,
Juvenile Justice and Mental Health: Innovation in the Laboratory of Human Behavior, 53 JURIMETRICS
J. 97, 97 (2012).
3. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65; Graham, 130 S. Ct at 2027 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See, e.g., Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: "Kids Are Just
Different" and "Kids Are Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
273, 273 (2007) ("The Supreme Court's Roper v. Simmons decision in 2005 was a victory for child
advocates."); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, "'Death is Different'No Longer": Graham v. Florida
and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 329
(2010) ("The decision had immediate and profound effects. . . .").
5. Michelle Marquis, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for Both Juveniles and
Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 255, 288 (2011); see John "Evan" Gibbs,
Jurisprudential Juxtaposition: Application of Graham v. Florida to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 957, 957 (2011). They also have gained the support of the psychiatric and mental health
communities, many members of which filed amicus briefs in support of the appellants in the cases
decided by the Court. See Colgan, supra note 2, at 82-85, 85 n.52. For a sampling of the relevant
literature, see, e.g., David A. Shapiro, What's Beneath the Graham Cracker?: The Potential Impact of
Comparative Law on the Future of Juvenile Justice Reform After Graham v. Florida, 24 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 119, 119-23 (2012); Leslie Patrice Wallace, "And I Don't Know Why It Is That You Threw Your
Life Away": Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires
States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 38 (2010); see generally
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,,6justice. None of these changes, however, speaks directly to the case of
the juvenile with mental illness or intellectual disabilities who is
incarcerated in either an adult or juvenile facility for a lesser crime, or for a
less severe sentence than LWOP. Such incarceration, in many instances,
violates international human rights law and may violate the Eighth
Amendment as well.
In its juvenile death penalty and LWOP cases, the Supreme Court
stressed that international law supported its decisions. Consider Justice
Kennedy's language for the majority in Roper:
Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment
for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty. This reality does not
become controlling, for the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment
remains our responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court's
decision in Trop [v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)], the Court has referred to
the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive
for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments." 356 U.S., at 102-03 (plurality opinion) ("The
civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is
not to be imposed as punishment for crime"); see also Atkins, supra, at
317, n. 21 (recognizing that "within the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved"); Thompson [v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988)], 830-31, and n. 31 [(1988)] (plurality opinion) (noting the
abolition of the juvenile death penalty "by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community," and observing that "[w]e have previously
recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual") ... .7
After Roper was decided, scholars and advocates were quick to point
out that this rationale would apply equally to LWOP sentences for
Tera Agyepong, Children Left Behind Bars: Sullivan, Graham, and Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences, 9 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 83 (2010) (stating that LWOP is one of the harshest sentences
one can receive, and that there is no proof that this sentence will deter future criminal conduct); Ellen
Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal
Court, 42 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1151 (2005) (explaining that a juvenile's lack of mental capacity,
compared to that of an adult, should bar him from being tried in criminal court).
6. Brianne Ogilvie, Comment, Is Life Unfair? What's Next for Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons,
60 BAYLOR L. REv. 293, 294 (2008); see generally Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH.
L. REv. 51 (2012) (articulating a blueprint for the expansive implementation of Graham).
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78 (citations omitted); see Tobias Brautigam, Comparative Law and
the US Supreme Court: Roper v. Simmons and the Quest for Theory, 16 FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L
L. 261, 261 (2005) (explaining that "comparative law had its day in court" in Roper); Shapiro, supra
note 5, at 130 (stating that the court used intemational law for its "persuasive power").
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juveniles.8  In one post-Graham analysis-concluding that the Graham
decision must "compel system-wide adherence and attention to its
principles of difference and its expressed commitment to affording youth
offenders a second chance at freedom, citizenship, and life"-the author
stressed that "compliance with Graham would entail a far more
transformative project than simply revising sentencing rules."9 Another
post-Graham analysis focused on the Court's "greater willingness to
consider international human rights standards and practices when assessing
sentencing practices within the United States."o An article written after
Miller speculated that "the Miller and Graham decisions may suggest a new
willingness to expand the Eighth Amendment doctrine.""
Again, in the wake of Roper, commentators argued that LWOP in
murder cases violated international human rights (IHR) standards.12 In the
wake of Graham, commentators argued that LWOP in any case violated
such standards.'3  Although the Supreme Court, in these decisions, has
endorsed such positions, it has not yet had the opportunity to consider the
IHR implications of either (1) the routine housing of juveniles in adult jails
and prisons14 or (2) the disproportionate number of incarcerated juveniles-
8. See, e.g., Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison:
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 983, 983 (2008) (stating that a "LWOP sentence condemns
a child to die in prison"); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 134-38 (illustrating the maximum sentences in
juvenile cases in other nations); Vincent G. Lvy, Comment, Enforcing International Norms in the
United States After Roper v. Simmons: The Case of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without
Parole, 45 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 262, 262 (2006).
9. Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 VT. L.
REv. 381, 391, 412 (2012).
10. Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 581, 599 (2012) (arguing that "three strikes" laws, as applied to
juveniles, were unconstitutional following Graham).
11. Sara Taylor, Comment, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1810,
1817-18 (2012). There was no mention of international law in Miller. See Jonathan Levy, The Case of
the Missing Argument: The Mysterious Disappearance ofInternational Law from Juvenile Sentencing in
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), 36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355, 355-56 (2013); see
generally Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment's Uncertain Future, 27
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2013, at 19, 19-20 (explaining that these cases may have irrevocably altered Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence).
12. See, e.g., Corina D. Gerety, Roper v. Simmons and the Role of International Laws, Practices
and Opinions in United States Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 565, 565
(2005); [Avy, supra note 8, at 269-72; see generally Marina Ann Magnuson, Taking Lives: How the
United States Has Violated the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights by Sentencing
Juveniles to Life Without Parole, 14 U.C. DAVIS. J. JUv. L. & POL'Y 163 (2010) (explaining that adults
and juveniles should be treated differently in terms of sentencing to prevent further breach of
international law).
13. Leonardo P. Caselli, Case Note, Criminal Law-ne Small Step for Juveniles, One Giant Leap
for Juvenile Justice; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 11 WYO. L. REv. 269, 293 (2011).
14. See Beth Caldwell, Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile
Delinquency Law in the United States and Mexico, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 105, 132 (2011)
("The United States incarcerates 10,000 children in adult jails and prisons every day.").
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both in juvenile and in adult correctional facilities-with mental
disabilities.5
In 2008, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) was ratified. 16 The Disability Convention "furthers the
human rights approach to disability and recognizes the right of people with
disabilities to equality in most aspects of life,"" calling for "[r]espect for
inherent dignity" and "[n]on-discrimination." Subsequent articles declare
"freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," "freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse," and a right
to protection of the "integrity of the person." 8
The Supreme Court has not yet had the occasion to consider the
significance of the CRPD.19 In Graham, however, the Court did note that
LWOP violated the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), a convention signed by every UN member except for the
United States and Somalia.20 So, failure to ratify in no way stops the Court
from considering the CRPD in subsequent litigation.2 1
15. See, e.g., Simone S. Hicks, Note, Behind Prison Walls: The Failing Treatment Choice for
Mentally Ill Minority Youth, 39 HOFSTRA L. REv. 979, 982-83 (2011) (stating that it has been estimated
that 50/o-75% of all incarcerated juveniles have mental disabilities); see generally infra Part H
(discussing the alarming number of incarcerated juveniles with mental disabilities).
16. Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
1203 (2007); Press Release, United Nations, With 20 Ratifications, Landmark Disability Treaty Set to
Enter into Force on 3 May (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/
hr4941.doc.htm (discussing the twentieth ratification of the convention); Chapter IV Human Rights:
Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsgno=IV-15&chapter=4&lang-en (last viewed Sept. 1, 2013); see
generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN
THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 143-68 (2012) (stating that the ratification of the CRPD had a significant
impact on the rights of persons with disabilities); Tara J. Melish, The UN Disability Convention:
Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2007,
at 37, 44 (discussing the positive outlook of the reform for people with disabilities and encouraging the
United States to ratify the Disability Convention); Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come ": The
Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the
Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2009)
(discussing the implications the ratification of the CRPD will likely have on the United States).
17. Michel L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection
Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV.
121, 138-39 (2011); see, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of
Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights
and Dignity ofPersons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 181, 184 (2005).
18. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/disabilities/
convention/conventionfull.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
19. See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty, DISABILITY SCOOP
(May 18, 2012), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/15654/
(reporting that President Obama signed the CRPD three years ago). The Senate failed to ratify the
CRPD on December 4, 2012, for lack of a supermajority of votes. See U.S. INT'L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITIES, http://usicd.org/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). The Democratic leadership has
promised to bring the Convention up again for ratification in 2013. Id.
20. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). The Graham Court stated:
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This Article will explore the relationship between the incarceration of
juveniles with mental disabilities and international human rights law,
especially the CRPD, and will conclude that our current system of
warehousing juveniles with mental illnesses in juvenile detention facilities
and reformatories and in prisons following pre-adjudication transfers
violates international human rights law, including, but not limited to, the
CRC and the CRPD. This Article will first consider the data available as to
the mental statuses of incarcerated juveniles, with special attention to issues
of race and gender.22 It will next consider the conditions of confinement
faced by such juveniles, looking at how jails and detention facilities are
increasingly relied upon to provide mental health services-albeit meager
and often counterproductive-and how this reliance has created a
deficiency that is exacerbated by current transfer and waiver policies.23  It
will then review the important international human rights documents that
apply to the questions under discussion.2 4 Finally, it will consider all of
these issues through the prism of therapeutic jurisprudence, with an eye
towards some specific remedies that might, optimally, ameliorate the
situation with which we are faced.25 In this context, I will also look at
We also note, as petitioner and his amici emphasize, that Article 37(a) of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Sept. 2, 1990), ratified by every nation except the United States and Somalia, prohibits the
imposition of 'life imprisonment without possibility of release . .. for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.
Id. The Court in Roper v. Simmons cited the same section, and added:
Parallel prohibitions are contained in other significant international covenants. See ICCPR,
Art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S., at 175 (prohibiting capital punishment for anyone under 18 at the
time of offense) (signed and ratified by the United States subject to a reservation regarding
Article 6(5), as noted, supra, at 1194); American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San
Jose, Costa Rica, Art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 (entered into force July 19,
1978) (same); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 5(3), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/ 24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999) (same).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
21. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (N.Y. Cnty. Sur. Ct. 2012)
(relying upon the CRPD after the failed ratification vote); In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433-34
(N.Y. Cnty. Sur. Ct. 2010) (relying upon the CRPD before the ratification vote); see David Kaye, State
Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (discussing how and why states should execute international law conventions); see
also Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind": The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
1159 (2013) (discussing the implications of these cases); see generally Kristin Booth Glen, Changing
Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REv. 93 (2012) (authored by the trial judge in the Dameris L. and Mark C.H. cases); Julian G. Ku,
Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 265 (2001) (providing a historical
overview of state courts' roles in interpreting intemational law).
22. See infra Part ll.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
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issues raised by considerations of the quality of counsel made available to
such juveniles.26
The title of this article is drawn, in part, from Bob Dylan's epic song,
It's All Over Now, Baby Blue. The first verse includes the key language:
You must leave now, take what you need, you think will last
But whatever you wish to keep, you better grab it fast
Yonder stands your orphan with his gun
Crying like a fire in the sun
Look out the saints are comin' through
And it's all over now, Baby Blue.27
The song-capturing the sadness of one "with tears that would burn a hole
within the largest star"28-tells us that we must be willing to "jettison ...
[our] own identity." 29 My sense is that it is the perfect description of what I
am discussing in this paper.
II. THE MENTAL STATUS OF INCARCERATED JUVENILES
A. Introduction
As the evidence demonstrates, the number of incarcerated juveniles
with mental disorders is alarming and is disproportionate to the juvenile
population as a whole. This disproportion is exacerbated when controlled
for race, gender, or family stability. Finally, this population of incarcerated
juveniles is inflated by the failure of the criminal justice system to properly
apply the laws that govern determinations of incompetency status, the
insanity defense, and Miranda waivers for this population.
B. Juveniles in Detention Facilities, Jails, and Prisons30
"Youths in the justice system are at high risk for mental health
problems that may have contributed to illegal behavior."31 The research of
26. See infra Part V.C.
27. BOB DYLAN, It's All Over Now Baby Blue, on BRINGING IT BACK HOME (Columbia Records
1965).
28. TIM RILEY, HARD RAIN: A DYLAN COMMENTARY 108 (1992).
29. MIKE MARQUSEE, CHIMES OF FREEDOM: THE POLITICS OF BOB DYLAN'S ART 128 (2003).
Ironically, the same social factors originally led to the creation of institutions for orphans and for
juvenile delinquents. See, e.g., Carl A. Auerbach, Is Government the Problem or the Solution?, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 495, 500-01 (1996); see also Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Anything Goes: A
History ofNew York's Gift and Loan Clauses, 75 ALB. L. REV. 2005, 2021-22 (2011-2012) (discussing
New York Constitution of 1894, art. VIIl, § 14 as an example of the granting of this authority).
30. See generally Erica van der Sloot & Robert Vermeiren, Forensic Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry, in IACAPAP TEXTBOOK OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH ch. J-3 (Joseph M.
Rey ed., 2012), available at iacapap.org/iacapap-textbook-of-child-and-adolescent-metal-health
(providing a helpful overview of all issues).
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Dr. Linda Teplin and her colleagues reveal that nearly 60% of male juvenile
detainees and more than two-thirds of female detainees meet diagnostic
criteria for one or more psychiatric disorders, and that these findings may
underestimate the true prevalence of these disorders-in part, because of
commonly underreported symptoms and impairments, especially in cases of
disruptive behavioral disorders.3 2 If undetected learning disabilities are
included, the prevalence rate climbs to at least 80%.33 Juveniles with
intellectual disabilities may be overrepresented in such facilities by a factor
of five.34 Prevalence rates for affective disorders range from 30% to 75% in
the various studies; 35 nearly half suffered from severe or moderate
depression. A Chicago study revealed that 79.7% of detained juveniles
were found to have at least one mental disorder, a percentage characterized
31. Gail A. Wasserman et al., The Voice DISC-IV with Incarcerated Male Youths: Prevalence of
Disorder, 41 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENTS PSYCHIATRY 314, 314 (2002).
32. Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES OF
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1113, 1137 (2002). Other surveys agree. See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 9-10 (2004) (discussing three studies finding disorders present in the 60%-70% range);
Richard E. Redding, Barriers to Meeting the Mental Health Needs of Juvenile Offenders, 19 DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L., no. 1, 1999 at 1, 1 (77%--93% of juveniles "have mental health problems"); Lois
A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled and Troublesome
Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1305, 1350 n.191 (2005) (citing research studies). At the least, researchers
found such disorder present in "almost half of the juveniles" studied. Deborah Katz Levi, State v. Mohi,
State Sanctioned Abuse?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 173, 185 (2007) (citing Cynthia M. Conward, Where
Have All the Children Gone?: A Look at Incarcerated Youth in America, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
2435, 2448 (2001)); see also Linda A. Teplin et al., Detecting Mental Disorder in Juvenile Detainees:
Who Receives Services, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773 (2005) (discussing the difficulties frequently
encountered in determining mental disorders in this population); Jennifer Wareham & Denise Paquette
Boots, The Link Between Mental Health Problems and Youth Violence in Adolescence: A Multilevel Test
of DSM-Oriented Problems, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1003 (2012) (discussing the relationship between
mental disorder and violent behavior among youths); see generally PATRICIA PURITZ & MARY ANN
SCALI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, BEYOND
THE WALLS: IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY REPORT (1998),
available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/1 64727.pdf.
33. Michael L. Perlin, "Simplify You, Classify You": Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in
Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 625 (2009). Beyond the scope of this
Article are the circumstances specific to juveniles with substance abuse disorders. The research clearly
demonstrates that juveniles with a substance use disorder, with or without co-occurring disorders, were
at greater risk for escalations in offense seriousness over time. See, e.g., Olivier Collins et al.,
Psychiatric Disorder in Detained Male Adolescents as Risk Factor for Serious Recidivism, 56 LA
REVUE CANADIENNE DE PSYCHIATRIE 44 (2011); Machteld Hoeve et al., The Influence ofMental Health
Disorders on Severity ofReoffending in Juveniles, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 289 (2013).
34. Trent D. Nelson, Comment, Congressional Attention Needed for the "Stay-Put" Provision of
the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 49, 58 n.61 (1997).
35. THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 32 (1998) (citing research reported in
R. Otto et al., Prevalence of Mental Disorders Among Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in
RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (J.
Cocozza ed., 1992)).
36. Jessica Ann Garascia, Note, The Price We Are Willing to Pay for Punitive Justice in the
Juvenile Detention System: Mentally Ill Delinquents and Their Disproportionate Share of the Burden,
80 IND. L.J. 489, 505 (2005).
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by one researcher as "staggering."3 7 At the lower end, there is no dispute
that in any studied cohort, at least 20% of these disorders involve a "serious
mental illness."
Such juveniles also have higher rates of physical injuries.39 Seventy
percent of juveniles being held in juvenile facilities "for mental health
purposes" in California have made suicide attempts.4 0 In at least one state
system, over half of incarcerated juveniles meet the full or partial criteria
for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).4 1
These statistics should not be a surprise, given what we know about
prevalence rates in adults in jail and prison settings. It is estimated that
15% of male adults in prisons and jails have a mental illness, as do 31% of
female adults,42 a rate of two to four times that of the general population.43
37. Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 33, 40
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
38. Liesel J. Danjczek, Comment, The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act
and Its Inappropriate Non- Violent Offender Limitation, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 76-77
(2007); see also Kasey Corbit, Note, Inadequate and Inappropriate Mental Health Treatment and
Minority Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 75, 83
(2005).
39. Theresa A. Hughes, Juvenile Delinquent Rehabilitation: Placement ofJuveniles Beyond Their
Communities as a Detriment to Inner-City Youths, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 153, 164 (2001). Juveniles
housed in adult prisons have a significantly higher suicide risk than those in all-juvenile facilities.
Jennifer L. Boothby, Contemporary United States Corrections, Mental Health, and Social Policy, in
CORRECTIONS, MENTAL HEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41, 44 (Robert
K. Ax & Thomas J. Fagan eds., 2007). This data becomes especially important in the context of what
we know about the outcomes of transfer and waiver decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 100-
13.
40. Corbit, supra note 38, at 82; see Albert R. Roberts & Kimberley Bender, Overcoming
Sisyphus: Effective Prediction of Mental Health Disorders and Recidivism Among Delinquents, 70 FED.
PROBATION 19, 19-20; see generally John M. Memory, Juvenile Suicides in Secure Detention
Facilities: Correction of Published Rates, 13 DEATH STUDIES 455 (1989) (providing an earlier archival
study).
41. See JULIAN D. FORD ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH & JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRAUMA
AMONG YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: CRITICAL ISSUES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 1 (2007);
see also Michael L. Perlin, "John Brown Went Off to War": Considering Veterans' Courts as Problem-
Solving Courts, 38 NOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (describing the role PTSD plays in the criminal
justice system).
42. Jason Schnittker et al., Out and Down: Incarceration and Psychiatric Disorders, 53 J. HEALTH
& Soc. BERAV. 448, 451-54 (2012) (explaining the strong causal relationship between incarceration and
major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder); Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental
Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 761 (2009).
43. See Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder Among Male Urban Jail
Detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 663,
664-65 (1990); see also Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 391-95 (2006); William E. Narrow et al., Revised Prevalence Estimates
of Mental Disorders in the United States, 59 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 115, 118-22 (2002);
Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the
Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 18 MICH. ST. U. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 5 n.12) (discussing the implications of these findings); Christina Canales, Note, Prisons:
The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1725 (2012); sources cited supra note 42; see
generally Jacqueline Buffington-Vollum, Mental Illness and the Criminal Justice System, in FLAWED
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There is little doubt that, just as (depending on where one lives) Rikers
Island, the Cook County House of Detention, or the Los Angeles County
Jail could be characterized as the "nation's largest mental institution";"
policymakers are aware "that the juvenile justice system is becoming a de
facto dumping ground for youth with mental health issues."45
C. Issues of Gender
As noted earlier, the disorder rate for female detainees and inmates is
significantly higher than for males, 4 6 and thus, females demonstrate an
"elevated risk" for psychiatric disorders.47 Significantly more females
(56.5%) than males (45.9%) met criteria for two or more psychiatric and
related disorders,48 and females have a significantly higher prevalence of
PTSD.49
CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES: AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE MEDIA, PUBLIC FEAR, AND LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE 221, 230-31 (Frances P. Reddington & Gene Bonham, Jr. eds., 2012).
44. See, e.g., Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental,
36 SETON HALL L. REv. 971, 978 (2006) (observing that, "in 1992, the Los Angeles County jail became
the nation's largest mental institution, with Cook County Jail, Illinois, and Riker's Island, New York, as
second and third respectively" (footnote omitted)). Judges concur with this finding. See Stephen S.
Goss, Mental Health Court Programs in Rural and Nonaffluent Jurisdictions, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 405,
405 (2008) ("Our jails have become the de facto mental health treatment centers for many
persons....").
45. Garascia, supra note 36, at 504 (citing Joseph J. Cocozza & Kathleen R. Skowyra, Youth with
Mental Health Disorders: Issues and Emerging Responses, 7 JUV. JUST., Apr. 2000, at 3, 5); see also
Aubrey L. Cunningham, Comment, Toward a System ofLeast Restrictive Care: Brown v. Plata and the
Eighth Amendment Right to Adequate Mental Health Care for the Incarcerated, 56 How. L.J. 253, 273
(2012).
46. See Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, supra note 32, at 1138
("Females had higher rates than males of many psychiatric disorders, including major depressive
episode[s and] some anxiety disorders . . . .").
47. See Gail A. Wasserman et al., Gender Difference in Psychiatric Disorders at Juvenile
Probation Intake, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 131, 135-36 (2005) (discussing a sampling of individuals
studied at probation intake); see also Stephane M. Shepherd et al., Gender and Ethnicity in Juvenile Risk
Assessment, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 388 (2013).
48. This included major depressive, dysthymic, manic, psychotic, panic, separation anxiety,
overanxious, generalized anxiety, obsessive-compulsive, ADHD, conduct, oppositional defiant, alcohol,
marijuana, and other substance disorders. See Garascia, supra note 36, at 506 (citing Karen M. Abram
et al., Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1097, 1099 (2003)); see also Gina Vincent et al., Sex and Race Differences in Mental Health Symptoms
in Juvenile Justice: The MAYSI-2 National Meta-Analysis, 47 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESC.
PSYCHIATRY 282 (2008) (showing that sexual differences in mental health symptoms of youth in the
juvenile justice system are "even larger" than statistics imply).
49. FORD ET AL., supra note 41, at 2 (finding a 49% prevalence rate for girls, as compared to 32%
for boys).
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D. Issues ofRace
The "disproportionate minority representation" in juvenile detention
facilities5o has especially pernicious impacts on the questions addressed
here, and minority youth are also "disproportionately represented among
youth with mental health issues."5  This must be considered in the context
of data showing that "minority youth are more likely than whites to be
arrested and detained for the same charges, twice as likely to be held in
secure pretrial confinement, and once securely detained, are confined for
longer periods of time than white youth."52 Although there is some
evidence that, for certain disorders, there are higher prevalence rates among
non-Hispanic white youths,53 at the least, two-thirds of black youths and
70% of Hispanic youths present significant psychiatric disorders. 5 4  "The
significant levels of unmet mental health needs" are particularly significant
in this cohort.ss
E. Impact ofBroken Homes
There is no question that the impact of stressors such as broken homes
contributes significantly to incidences of juvenile delinquency.56  "The
United States Office of the Surgeon General has identified 'broken homes'
and 'separation from parents' as risk factors for juvenile delinquency";57
this recognition indicates the propensity of children from broken homes to
50. Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age ofthe Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 385, 448 (2008); see also Shepherd et al., supra note 47; Corbit, supra note
38, at 77 (stating "minority youth are only one-third of the U.S. adolescent population, yet they account
for two-thirds of incarcerated adolescents"); see generally Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal
Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013) (highlighting the disparity among incarcerated individuals that are part of
minority groups).
51. Hicks, supra note 15, at 982.
52. Conward, supra note 32, at 2454.
53. See Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, supra note 32, at 1138.
54. GRIsso, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 10.
55. Henning, supra note 50, at 451; see Debra Srebnik et al., Help-Seeking Pathways for Children
and Adolescents, 4 J. EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 210 (1996) (describing how the unmet needs of
juveniles differ from those of adults).
56. See, e.g., DAVID P. FARRINGTON & BRANDON C. WELSH, SAVING CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF
CRIME: EARLY RISK FACTORS AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 68-69 (2007). Astonishingly, a survey
has revealed that 20% of parents of children with serious mental disorders have been told by authorities
that they must relinquish custody to either the child welfare system or juvenile justice system in an effort
to obtain intensive mental health services for their children. Scott Nolen, Adolescent Mental Health and
Justice for Juveniles, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 189, 224 (2008).
57. Cara A. Gardner, Recent Development, Failing to Serve and Protect: A Proposal for an
Amendment to a Juvenile's Right to a Parent, Guardian, or Custodian During a Police Interrogation
After State v. Oglesby, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1685, 1696 (2008) (quoting MICHAEL SHADER, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, RISK FACTORS FOR
DELINQUENCY: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojdp/frd030127.
pdf).
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commit violent acts significantly more frequently than those who do not
have such backgrounds. By way of example, an Australian study showed
"that children were ten to fifteen percent more likely to commit crimes" if
they came from "broken homes" than from "intact families."59  Male
delinquents are significantly more likely to come from broken homes than
male youths in the general population.o
F. Relationship with Substantive and Procedural Criminal Law
In a recent article, I discussed how the past thirty years have seen a
cluster of changes to criminal procedure (via statute and judicial decisions,
both leading to changes in practice) that, "in the aggregate, make the use of
an insanity defense or the raising of a mental status issue a much less
attractive option to the defendant than ever before." 6 1 As part of my inquiry
into this topic, I considered
* The narrowing of the insanity defense;
* The constitutional sanctioning of lengths of commitment
for insanity acquittees that are far longer than the maximum
sentences for the underlying charged offenses;
* Supreme Court decisions making it less likely that jurors
will accept the insanity defense;
* The extended sentences faced by defendants who
unsuccessfully raise the insanity defense; and
* The failure of most states to comply with the now forty-
year-old mandate of Jackson v. Indiana, barring, on paper
at least, the indeterminate commitment in maximum
security forensic facilities of defendants who are not likely
to regain their competency to stand trial in the foreseeable
future.6 2
58. SHADER, supra note 57, at 2.
59. Kenneth S. Mitchell-Phillips Sr., Five Steps to a Healthy Divorce: A More Supportive Legal
Approach to Post-Divorce High-Conflict Relationships, 6 WHITIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 147, 160
(2006) (quoting PAT JOBES, THE USE OF MULTIPLE SOCIAL SERVICES AMONG CHRONICALLY
OFFENDING YOUTH 6 (2004), available at http://www.criminologyresearchcounsel.gov.au/reports2004-
08-jobes.pdf).
60. Cary Heck & Anthony Walsh, The Effects ofMaltreatment and Family Structure on Minor and
Serious Delinquency, 44 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 178, 184 (2000); see
generally Lynn D. Wardle, The Fall of Marital Family Stability and the Rise of Juvenile Delinquency,
10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 83, 93-94 (2007).
61. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the
Criminalization ofPersons with Mental Illness, supra note 43, manuscript at 21.
62. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1972); Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail":
Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness,
supra note 43, manuscript at 8-9.
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When we look collaterally at these issues in the context of juveniles
with mental disabilities charged with crimes, some evidence emerges. It is
clear that the criminal justice system has not made substantial efforts to
clarify the application of incompetency status to juveniles awaiting trial,63 a
question that, according to Professor Thomas Grisso, remains "almost
entirely unexplored and unspecified in most jurisdictions.""6 In other
research, Professor Grisso and his colleagues have found that juveniles
under the age of fifteen tended to perform at a level of impairment
consistent with that of adults who have been found incompetent to stand
trial.6 5 In some states, determinations of juveniles' competencies are
precluded by the prohibition of "mental health evaluations prior to the entry
of delinquency adjudications."66  In others, however, courts have mandated
appropriate treatment for juveniles found incompetent to stand trial,67 but
"[1]ittle is known about the nature of [the] treatment" such juveniles
actually receive.
Further, not all states allow juveniles to raise the insanity defense,6 9 an
issue of significant importance as "evidence continues to accumulate that
the juvenile justice system is generally failing in its primary, articulated
63. GRIsSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 32, at 168-70, 176 (discussing research reported in
Ann Tobey, Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz, Youths' Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and
Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 225, Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso,
Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 73, and Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost,
Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353 (2001)).
64. GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 32, at 170. Professor Grisso and a colleague, working
with the National Youth Screening and Assessment Project, have crafted model statutes to be used in the
determination of competency to stand trial in juvenile proceedings, but there is no evidence that any
states have adopted their sound suggestions. See generally KIMBERLY LARSON & THOMAS GRISSO,
DEVELOPING STATUTES FOR COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS:
A GUIDE FOR LAWMAKERS (2011), available at http://modelsforchange.net/publications/330 (providing
an example of statutory language to aid states in determining whether a juvenile is competent to stand
trial).
65. Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents'
and Adults'Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 333 (2003).
66. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 8A-6.1, at 84 (2d ed.
2002 & Supp. 2012); see Mary Sue Backus, Achieving Fundamental Fairness for Oklahoma's
Juveniles: The Role for Competency in Juvenile Proceedings, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 41 (2012) (analyzing
Oklahoma's policies for evaluating the competency ofjuveniles before trial).
67. See, e.g., T.L. v. State, 670 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
68. GRISSo, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 32, at 170; see Annette Christy et al., Juveniles
Evaluated Incompetent to Proceed: Characteristics and Quality of Mental Health Professionals'
Evaluations, 35 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 380, 386-87 (2004) (discussing the quality of expert
evaluations in cases in which concerns exist regarding a juvenile's competency to stand trial); Jodi L.
Viljoen et al., Defense Attorneys' Concerns About the Competence of Adolescent Defendants, 28
BEHAv. SCI. & L. 630 (2010) (explaining the role of counsel when concerns are raised about ajuvenile's
competence to stand trial).
69. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 66, § 9A-9.1, at
246; see, e.g., In re C. W. M., 407 A.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. 1979); Commonwealth v. Chatman, 538
S.E.2d 304, 308-09 (Va. 2000).
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rehabilitative goals."70  Again, Professor Grisso points out that "most
juvenile justice jurisdictions have never seen an insanity defense ....
Either the relevance of the insanity defense has not been discovered by the
juvenile court, or it has simply been deemed unnecessary."
Another issue that must be considered is how Miranda waiver must be
contextualized in cases involving juveniles.72 Again, Professor Grisso's
research is essential:
As a class, juveniles of ages 14 and below demonstrate incompetence
to waive their rights to silence and legal counsel. This conclusion is
generally supported across measures of both understanding and perception
in our studies, and in relation to both absolute and relative (adult norm)
standards.
As a class, juveniles of ages 15 and 16 who have IQ scores of 80 or
below lack the requisite competence to waive their rights to silence and
counsel.
About one-third to one-half of juveniles 15 and 16 years of age with
IQ scores above 80 lack the requisite competence to waive their rights
when competence is defined by absolute standards (that is, the satisfaction
of scoring criteria for adequate understanding). As a class, however, this
group demonstrates a level of understanding and perception similar to that
of 17-21-year-old adults for whom the competence to waive rights is
presumed in law. 73
This evidence-later supported by independent empirical studies 74 that
remain "uncontroverted" 75-led Professor Grisso to call for a per se
70. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 66, § 9A-9.1, at 246
n.761.
71. GRisso, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 174.
72. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402-03 (2011) (holding that a child's age must
be taken into account for Miranda purposes as long as the officer knew the child's age or the child's age
would have been apparent to a reasonable officer); see generally Emily C. Keller, Constitutional
Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., II CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 306-12 (2012); Lourdes M. Rosado, Outside the Police Station: Dealing with the
Potential for Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 177, 192-200 (2012)
(discussing the special risks inherent in juvenile self-incrimination).
73. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession
Suppression Law, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 138-39 (2012) (quoting THOMAS GRISSO,
JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 193-94 (1981) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
74. See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles' Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 28 (2006); see also Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What
Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 1, 6-20 (2013) (updating Professor
Feld's research on interrogation ofjuveniles).
75. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54
FLA. L. REv. 577, 631 (2002).
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exclusionary rule for Miranda waivers by juveniles. And, as Professor
Mary Berkheiser has perceptively noted, the evidence is "particularly
disturbing when viewed in light of the disproportionate number of juveniles
adjudicated delinquent who have been diagnosed as learning disabled."77
When taken together, the evidence as to incompetency, insanity and
Miranda waivers paints a troubling picture. Because the criminal justice
system ignores the fact that juveniles may not be competent to stand trial
and the fact that they may not be criminally responsible, their opportunities
for diversion to mental health facilities are diminished.7 8  Because the
system, in large part, shuts its eyes to the meaninglessness of Miranda
waivers (and subsequently countenances the conviction of confessing
juveniles), even more juveniles wind up in long-term detention facilities.79
When added to the data reported on above, the results are especially toxic.80
III. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
A. Introduction
Given the bleak picture just painted, it is necessary to consider a
cohort of related questions whose significance is magnified by data as to the
relationship between mental disorder and juvenile incarceration. In this
section, I will consider the conditions of confinement in the juvenile
detention system in general, and will look more specifically at the ways in
which the treatment interventions offered may be anti-therapeutic, at the
implications of reliance on jails and prisons as mental health facilities, and
at the impact of transfer and waiver rules on this population.82
B. Conditions in General
Over thirty years ago, Jane Knitzer, one of the nation's most
prominent children's advocates, reported that the needs of children with
mental disorders in the juvenile justice system were largely neglected and
76. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1143-51, 1160-66 (1980); see Henning, supra note 50, at 441 (discussing the
susceptibility of adolescents to confess falsely).
77. Berkheiser, supra note 75, at 630 (citing Steven A. Greenburg, Learning Disabled Juveniles &
Miranda Rights-What Constitutes Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 487, 490 (1991)); see generally Perlin, "Simply You, Classify You ": Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil
Rights in Disability Classtfication Systems, supra note 33, at 625-29 (discussing evidence that learning-
disabled juveniles represent a disproportionate number of people in the juvenile justice system).
78. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
82. See infra Part III.B-D.
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ignored," a judgment echoed a decade later by Joseph Cocozza, who noted
ruefully that "the situation had not changed."84 Revisiting this issue a
decade ago, Mark Soler concluded that, by and large, the entire range of
problems-poor assessment, meager treatment, inadequate training, and
dangerous institutions-still remained.
None of the research reported upon in the past decade gives us any
hope that there has been any significant amelioration. "[M]ost states are
barely able to ensure the physical safety of their juvenile inmates";86
"inhumane conditions of confinement ... and inadequate rehabilitative
services" are still common.87 "[P]unishment, retribution, and a tolerance of
harsh conditions of confinement" are still the indicia of most juvenile
justice detention facilities.88 Little has changed in the fourteen years since
Professor Barry Feld concluded that "[c]riminological research, judicial
opinions, and investigative studies report staff beatings of inmates, the use
of medications for social control purposes, extensive reliance on solitary
confinement, and a virtual absence of meaningful rehabilitative
programs."89
Some of the data is nearly unbelievable. Professor Douglas Abrams
reported on findings at the Oakley Training School and the Columbia
Training School, both in Mississippi:
The Justice Department found that children at Oakley and Columbia were
hog-tied, pole-shackled, locked in mechanical restraints and isolation
units, and routinely assaulted by staff. . . . Pole-shackled children had
83. JANE KNITZER & LYNN OLSON, UNCLAIMED CHILDREN: THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN NEED OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 42-49
(1982).
84. Joseph Cocozza, Introduction, in RESPONDING TO THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 35, at 1.
85. Mark Soler, Health Issues for Adolescents in the Justice System, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
321, 321-24 (2002). These conditions, inexplicably, receive little attention. See MATTHEW B.
ROBINSON, MEDIA COVERAGE OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 312-15 (2011). A major and
exhaustive study of media coverage of crime and criminal justice makes no mention whatsoever of
conditions in juvenile detention facilities. See id. at 185-217. Perhaps, though, this should not be that
inexplicable. See also William Drakeford et al., An Examination of Disability Issues in Introductory
Juvenile and Criminal Justice Textbooks, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 280, 288 (2005) (finding that a
review of all texts used in criminal justice courses revealed "very little information related to the
prevalence of disabilities in the juvenile or criminal justice system").
86. Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2012).
87. Jennifer K. Pokempner et al., The Legal Significance ofAdolescent Development on the Right
to Counsel: Establishing the Constitutional Right to Counsel for Teens in Child Welfare Matters and
Assuring a Meaningful Right to Counsel in Delinquency Matters, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 570-
71(2012).
88. Sussman, supra note 9, at 389.
89. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack
Down" on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 378-79 (1999) (citation omitted); see also Caldwell,
Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency Law in the United States
and Mexico, supra note 14, at 134.
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their hands and legs handcuffed around a utility pole for hours while other
youths performed military drills around them.
Oakley and Columbia staff also regularly sprayed children with
potentially lethal oleoresin capiscum (OC) pepper spray as punishment for
minor infractions when no safety risks existed....
The Justice Department found that guards sometimes stripped
suicidal girls naked and hog-tied them in Columbia's "dark room," where
they were held for three days to a week. The room was a locked,
windowless isolation cell with nothing but a drain in the floor through
which the girls urinated and defecated but which they could not flush....
Staff sometimes used restraint chairs for punishment, sometimes hog-tied
the girls, and sometimes used OC spray on them for minor misbehavior.
The girls were often denied water, personal hygiene items, bathroom
facilities, and sufficient mental health care, even though many of the girls
suffered from forms of mental disorders, particularly separation anxiety
disorder.
Girls reported being forced to eat their own vomit if they threw up
while exercising in the hot sun. Youths recommitted to Oakley were taken
to an isolation room and punched and slapped by staff as punishment.
Staff confirmed that one counselor choked a boy, and another boy reported
that a staff member had shoved his head into a toilet....
At both institutions, youths with mental health conditions received
only "haphazard and cursory" treatment, and many youths were denied the
psychiatric medications they had previously taken. Rather than receiving
counseling, rehabilitative treatment, and education, suicidal youths were
kept, sometimes naked, on the concrete floor of bare isolation cells with
no mattresses during the day. Justice Department consultants observed a
thirteen-year-old boy sitting in the restraint chair near the control room at
Oakley, reportedly to prevent self-mutilation. Family members had
severely sexually abused the boy, who had been in several psychiatric
hospitals. As described in the report:
No staff approached him, and he was not allowed to attend
school or receive programming, counseling, or medication. . . . Just
before our arrival, he had been locked naked in his empty cell. His
cell smelled of urine, and we observed torn pieces of toilet paper
on the concrete floor that he had been using as a pillow.90
90. Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency Treatment to Enhance Rehabilitation,
Personal Accountability, and Public Safety, 84 OR. L. REV. 1001, 1046-48 (2005) (final alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to the Hon. Ronnie Muzgrove, Governor of Miss. 10 (June 19, 2003)); see also Emily
Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983 Liability in the Context of Disciplinary
Alternative Schools and Beyond, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 615, 642 n.129 (2012) (discussing Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief % 1, 17, 20-32, J.H. ex rel. Gray v. Hinds Cnty., Miss., No. 3:1 1-cv-
327-DPJ-FKB, 2011 WL 3047667 (S.D. Miss. July 25, 2011)); R. Daniel Okonkwo & Dylan Nicole De
Kervor, There Are Two Sides to Every Story: Collaboration Between Advocates and Defenders in
Achieving Systematic Juvenile Justice Reform, 15 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 435, 446-47 (2012)
(discussing similar conditions in Louisiana facilities); Charlyn Bohland, Comment, No Longer a Child:
Juvenile Incarceration in America, 39 CAP. U.L. REV. 193, 210-16 (2011) (discussing similar
conditions in Ohio and Texas facilities).
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Professor Beth Caldwell's observation that "[c]onditions of
confinement in juvenile detention facilities are troubling from a human
rights perspective as well" must be considered in light of data such as that
reported by Professor Abrams.91
C. Anti-Therapeutic Medical Interventions
What treatment that is offered is often anti-therapeutic. Professor
Angela Burton's comprehensive review documents how juveniles are
overly medicated through the use of "indiscriminate and unchecked"
psychotropic medications. 92 Professor Abrams reports on a juvenile judge
in Florida complaining that some of the incarcerated youths who appeared
before him in court seemed to be "sort of in a semicoma. "93 Thomas Grisso
underscores the issue: "Providing . . . clinical treatment that does not have a
clear necessity, purpose, and potential benefit incurs risks of harm without
adequate justification." 94
Professor Thomas Hafemeister has called for the implementation of an
affirmative right to mental health treatment for all detained juvenile
offenders, 9 5 but it is clear that this has not happened in the near-decade
since he articulated the foundations of this right.96 A significant number of
incarcerated juveniles simply receive no mental health treatment.97 Inmany
91. Caldwell, Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative Analysis ofJuvenile Delinquency Law in
the United States and Mexico, supra note 14, at 134; see generally infra Part IV.
92. Angela Olivia Burton, "They Use It Like Candy": How The Prescription of Psychotropic
Drugs to State-Involved Children Violates International Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453, 512 (2010);
see also Sussman, supra note 9, at 401; Ashley A. Norton, Note, The Captive Mind: Antipsychotics as
Chemical Restraint in Juvenile Detention, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 152, 153-54 (2012); see
generally infra Part IV (discussing the international human rights implications of these practices). On
racial disparities in drug use in the related context of foster care, see Susan dosReis et al., Antipsychotic
Treatment Among Youth in Foster Care, 128 PEDIATRICS 1459 (2011).
93. Abrams, supra note 90, at 1011-12 (quoting Megan O'Matz, Young Offenders'Antidepressant
Use Draws Concern: After an FDA Warning About Suicides, Some Fear Overmedication in the
Juvenile-Justice System, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 2004, at B5, available at http://articles.orlando
sentinel.com/2004-06-22/news/04-06220043_1_department-of-juvenile-justice-antidepressants)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
94. GRIsSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 130.
95. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Parameters and Implementation of a Right to Mental Health
Treatment for Juvenile Offenders, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 61, 61-62 (2004).
96. State v. Angilau, 245 P.3d 745, 756 (Utah 2011) (holding that a juvenile has no fundamental
right to treatment in the juvenile system); see generally JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
11-35 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/182503.pdf (providing a comprehensive
survey of early litigation).
97. See David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study: Emerging Issues
Challenging the Competence ofJuveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 503, 565 (2006);
see also Andres J. Pumariega et al., Mental Health and Incarcerated Youth II: Service Utilization, 8 J.
CHILD & FAM. STUD. 205, 205-08 (1999); Joan Thomas et al., The Availability of Behavioral Health
Services for Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, 11 J. AM. PSYCHIATRIC NURSES AsS'N 156, 156-57
(2005).
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jurisdictions, there is no mental health screening at all.98 The majority of
juvenile detention centers have retained juveniles with mental disabilities
"because there was nowhere else for them to go."99 But again, the juvenile
justice system has become "a de facto dumping ground for youth with
mental health issues,"100 a problem exacerbated by the reality that the
mental health service and treatment needs of juveniles will grow while they
are incarcerated.' 0 '
D. Transfers
All of this is exacerbated by our juvenile waiver and transfer policies,
policies that have "profound" consequences.102 In all states, special
proceedings are available to transfer youth under the usual age threshold
from juvenile to criminal court.10 3 Judicial transfers require a hearing and
findings as to the juvenile's "dangerousness" and "amenability to
treatment."'" Statutory exclusion transfers and prosecutorial discretion
transfers rarely include any consideration of the juvenile's psychological
characteristics or mental state. 0 5 Such transfers are often pretextual.10 6
98. See Sussman, supra note 9, at 400 ("Many juvenile justice facilities routinely fail to conduct
the necessary mental health screenings, even when such screenings are mandated by state law. Over
half of youth offenders are in facilities that do not screen all residents; 64% of facilities do not use
standardized mental health assessments; and very few facilities adapt their assessments to the variation
in needs accompanying increased system penetration or screen for trauma-related symptoms. And when
mental health screenings are conducted, it is often 'in a haphazard fashion or by untrained staff."'
(quoting RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., No PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR
REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 24 (2011)) (footnotes omitted))).
99. Colleen Bums, Access to Mental Health Services for Juvenile Detainees, 18 ANNALS HEALTH
L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 150, 151 (2009); see also Nolen, supra note 56, at 222-24.
100. Garascia, supra note 36, at 504; see also Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing how Graham might support a finding of a right to
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system).
101. Compare Sussman, supra note 9, at 395, with Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[I]t would be consistent with the Court's reasoning today to include within
the 'minimally adequate training required by the Constitution,' such training as is reasonably necessary
to prevent a person's pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment."
(citation omitted)); see also PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 66,
§ 3A-9.9, at 106-08 (discussing the significance ofthe concurring opinion in Youngberg).
102. MARY ALICE CONROY & DANIEL C. MURRIE, FORENSIC ASSESSMENT OF VIOLENCE RISK: A
GUIDE FOR RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 233 (2007).
103. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 13,
13 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE CHANGING BORDERS].
104. GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 192. Although judicial
waiver is generally less problematic than prosecutorially initiated waiver, judicial waiver "can have the
same constitutional concerns as statutory or prosecutorial waiver." See Jennifer Park, Balancing
Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 786, 802 (2008).
105. GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 192-93; see also Vanessa L.
Kolbe, A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Concerns Regarding the Use ofJuvenile Psychopathy Scores in Judicial
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There is little question that these policies were implemented and
expanded as part of the "get tough" policies of the punitive juvenile justice
system.o0 The principal focus of waivers based on prosecutorial discretion
and automatic transfer emphasizes the crime committed to the near
exclusion of consideration of the juvenile who transgresses. 08 And there is
little question, again quoting Grisso, that "transferring youths with mental
disorders to the criminal justice system is almost certain to provide some
volume of cases in which the justice system fails to provide treatment in the
interest of long-range public safety."'0o
The most comprehensive aggregate analysis of transfer policies yields
three findings:
First, transfer appears to be counterproductive: transferred youths are more
likely to reoffend, and to reoffend more quickly and more often, than those
retained in the juvenile justice system. In addition, research suggests that
the differential effects of criminal and juvenile justice processing are not
dependent on sentence type or sentence length. That is, the mere fact that
juveniles have been convicted in criminal rather than juvenile court
increases the likelihood that they will reoffend. Finally, the risk of
reoffending is aggravated when a sentence of incarceration is imposed.I10
Waiver Hearings, 26 DEV. IN MENTAL HEALTH L. 1 (2007); Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Offenders in
Criminal Court and Adult Prison: Legal, Psychological, and Behavioral Outcomes, 50 JUV. & FAM. CT.
J., no. 1, 1999 at 1, 2-3 (providing an overview of various states' laws regarding juveniles eligible to be
sentenced to adult jails and prisons).
106. See Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and Reconstructing the
Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 299, 330 (1999). For earlier studies
concluding that transfers were often done for "cosmetic purposes to create the impression or illusion that
juvenile court is enforcing a 'get tough' policy," see CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & STUART J. MILLER,
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 214 (2d ed. 1998). There are profound issues of racial disparity. See
Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals ofHumane Punishment to Constitutional
Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 121 n.39 (2007). An Illinois study found that African-
Americans comprise 15% of the state's juvenile population, but 85.5% of the juveniles transferred to
adult court. Id. I discuss the pretextuality of much of our mental disability law and policy in, inter alia,
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000).
107. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on
Youth Crime, supra note 89, at 345, 361.
108. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Transfer, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 599, 602 (2004); see,
e.g., Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An Equal Protection
Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 285, 306 (2008) ("[Tl]he decision to waive a juvenile to
adult court is often based as much on the attributes of the offender as it is on the attributes of the
offense."). Remarkably, no state has yet reexamined its transfer and waiver policy in the context of
racial and ethnic disparities. See Mark Soler, Missed Opportunity: Waiver, Race, Data, and Policy
Reform, 71 LA. L. REV. 17, 17 (2010).
109. GRISsO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES, supra note 35, at 196. On how Graham might
support a challenge to the constitutionality of transfer laws, see Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida
to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99, 103 (2010).
110. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS, supra note 103, at 261 (citation omitted) (referencing, inter alia, Jeffrey Fagan, The
Comparative Advantage ofJuvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent
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Consider these empirical findings: Juveniles incarcerated in adult
institutions are "5 times more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely
to be beaten by staff, and 50% more likely to be attacked with a weapon
than youth in juvenile facilities.""' These conditions may be especially
damaging for youths with mental disorders, who are almost eight times
more likely to commit suicide in adult jails than in juvenile institutions."12
In short, conditions faced by juveniles in detention and incarceration in
adult facilities are dangerous, damaging, and life-threatening.' 1 3
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Introduction
There is a rich body of literature that discusses the intersection
between international human rights law and the Supreme Court's death
penalty and LWOP decisions as they apply to juveniles.1 4 Most-but not
all-focus on the CRC, and specifically, Article 37, which states:
Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77 (1996), and Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men From the Boys:
The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT, CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A
SOURCEBOOK 238, 245 (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995)). Also, the justice system "systematically
waives juveniles of uncertain competency to adult court for prosecution." Wayne A. Logan,
Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 681, 716 (1988) (citing, inter alia, Deborah K. Cooper, Juveniles' Understanding of Trial-Related
Information: Are They Competent Defendants?, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 167, 168-69, 177-78 (1997), and
Kirk Heilbrun et al., A National Survey of U.S. Statutes on Juvenile Transfer: Implications for Policy
and Practice, 15 BEHAV. SC. & L. 125, 145 (1997)).
111. Patrick Geary, Note, Juvenile Mental Health Courts and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Facing
the Challenges Posed by Youth with Mental Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 671, 700 (2005) (quoting Soler, supra note 85, at 326) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
112. Id; see also Sussman, supra note 9, at 400 ("Only 31% of youth offenders are in facilities that
require this screening to be done by mental health professionals." (quoting ANDREA J. SEDLAK &
KARLA S. MCPHERSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, YOUTH'S NEEDS AND SERVICES: FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEY OF YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL
PLACEMENT 3 (2010), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/227728.pdf).
113. See Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel's Obligation to Present Mitigating
Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 393 (2012) (discussing how Roper and
Graham constitutionally obligate counsel to present mitigating evidence in cases in which juveniles are
tried in adult courts).
114. See, e.g., Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life
Really Better Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2006); Martin Guggenheim,
Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
457 (2012); Stephen C. McCaffrey, There's a Whole World Out There: Justice Kennedy's Use of
International Sources, 44 McGEORGE L. REV. 201 (2013); Kyra Nicole Millich, Juvenile Justice: An
Appeal to Join the Civilized World, 35 CHAMPION 36 (2011); Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson,
Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in America, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281 (2012);
Shapiro, supra note 5.
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(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years of age[lJ 5
I will discuss that body of literature briefly in this section, but will
focus predominantly on the potential impact of the United Nations
CRPD."'6  To this point in time, there has been discussion in neither the
case law, nor the literature about the CRPD in this context, but I believe,
given the picture I have sought to paint in Parts I and II of this Article, it is
a document to which we must turn our attention if we are to think seriously
about possible remedies for the current state of affairs in which, as one
student author began the title of her Note, "The United States Stands
Alone."" 7
B. Human Rights in General in This Context'18
Offenders have enforceable human rights."'9 For instance, individual
rights of offenders are safeguarded against "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment";12 0 prisoners should be treated with humanity and
dignity and should be provided with reformation and social rehabilitation;' 2 '
individuals are guaranteed the right to the "highest attainable standard of
115. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
28 I.L.M. 1448, 1468-70 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990), available at http://www.ovesupport.net/s/
library.php?ld=123.
116. See Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, supra note 18.
117. See Lisa S. Yun, Note, The United States Stands Alone: An International Consensus Against
Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 727, 727 (2011).
118. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, "Where Souls Are
Forgotten ": Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International Human Rights, 15
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 257 (2009).
119. See, e.g., Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and
Forsaked": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners
and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 231 (2008); Astrid
Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Horne in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison": A Human
Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in
Correctional Settings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 256 (2009); Michael L. Perlin & Henry A.
Dlugacz, "It's Doom Alone That Counts ": Can International Human Rights Law Be an Effective Source
of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 675 (2009); see also Robert
Kinscherff & Thomas Grisso, Human Rights Violations and Standard 1.02: Intersections with Human
Rights Law and Applications in Juvenile Capital Cases, 23 ETHICS & BEHAV. 71 (2013) (discussing the
relationship between international human rights standards and the ethical code of psychologists in this
context).
120. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, Dec.
19, 1966, 1972 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/volume%20999/volume-999-1-14668-English.pdf.
121. Id. at art. 10.
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physical and mental health"; 12 2 individuals are guaranteed respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms in forensic and correctional
systems; 123 and prisoners should be treated in a humane manner and with
dignity. 124 It goes without saying-or, at least, it should go without saying
-that these rights apply to juveniles, as well as to adults.
C The CRC and Other International Human Rights Documents
I begin with what may surprise those who are new to this area of law
and policy. As noted earlier, every nation in the world-except for the
United States and Somalia-has ratified the CRC, forbidding juvenile
execution and LWOP for juveniles. 12 5 Importantly, as noted in the
introduction to this paper, the Supreme Court's decisions in Roper and in
Graham both, nonetheless, squarely implicate international human rights
law in the context of death penalty and LWOP issues.
Roper, by way of example, explains how both international treaties
and international practice support the majority's position in banning the
juvenile death penalty.12 6 The Court noted that besides the CRC, there exist
parallel prohibitions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,12 7 the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,'2 8 and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.12 9 In addition, the
Court looked at international practice, noting that only seven countries other
than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990,130 and
that, since that time, "each of these countries has either abolished capital
122. UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIc, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS, DEC. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 12 [hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%201/Chapter%201V/IV-3.en.pdf.
123. Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First
Century, G.A. Res.44/49, 92, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess. A/RES/55/59 (Jan. 17, 2001).
124. United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, 91 U.N. Doc. A/RES/93/173 (Dec. 9, 1988); see
generally Birgden & Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison": A Human
Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in
Correctional Settings, supra note 119; Perlin & Dlugacz, supra note 119.
125. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
126. There is no question in my mind that Jason Chandler is right when he notes that "Roper has
become a lightning rod in the foreign law debate." See Jason Chandler, Note, Foreign Law-A Friend
of the Court: An Argument for Prudent Use of International Law in Domestic, Human Rights Related
Constitutional Decisions, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 117, 126 (2011).
127. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (referring to Art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S., at 175, which prohibits capital
punishment for anyone under eighteen at the time of the offense, and was signed and ratified by the
United States, subject to a reservation regarding Article 6(5)).
128. Id. (referring to the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146
(entered into force July 19, 1978)).
129. Id. (referring to Art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/ 24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29,
1999)).
130. Id. at 577. The nations are Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and China. Id.
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punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice."' 3 ' It
stressed that international opinion was not controlling, but merely
confirmatory, 132 and concluded on this point that "[i]t does not lessen our
fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that
the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our
own heritage of freedom."' 33
Later, in Graham, the Court re-emphasized this point:
There is support for our conclusion in the fact that, in continuing to
impose life without parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit
homicide, the United States adheres to a sentencing practice rejected the
world over. This observation does not control our decision. The
judgments of other nations and the international community are not
dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. But .' [tlhe
climate of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a
particular punishment' is also 'not irrelevant." 
Again, in Graham, the Court returned to Article 37 of the CRC for
support.13 5
In the years since Roper,136 scholars have argued that international law
should also be applied to other aspects of the juvenile correctional and
detention system, as well as the criminal justice system, with regard to
131. Id.
132. See Linda M. Keller, Using International Human Rights Law in US Courts: Lessons from the
Campaign Against the Juvenile Death Penalty, in WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN? THE COMPETING
PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 91 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Karen
Worthington eds., 2009).
133. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The majority opinion was trivialized and mocked by Justice Scalia in
his dissent, in which he rejected the notion that international law or opinion was relevant at all to the
question before the Court. See id at 622-28.
134. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
796 n.22 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id. at 2034. On the near-universal rejection of LWOP in other nations, see Agyepong, supra
note 5, at 83. See, by way of example, the criminal code of Sierra Leone, as discussed in Danielle Fritz,
Note, Child Pirates from Somalia: A Call for the International Community to Support the Further
Development ofJuvenile Justice Systems in Puntland and Somaliland, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 891,
908 n. 114 (2012) ("Should any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime
between 15 and 18 years of age come before this court, he or she shall be treated with dignity and a
sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and the desirability of promoting his or her
rehabilitation, reintegration into and assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with
international human rights, in particular the rights of the child." (quoting Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, art. 7 T 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137)).
136. Some scholars also wrote about this question in the years before Roper. See, e.g., Peter J.
Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 570 n.5 (1997)
(considering conditions in which juveniles are housed in adult correctional facilities).
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matters ranging from statutory rape laws,'37  to standards in juvenile
detention facilities,'38 to issues of disparate gender treatment,'3 9 to the
conditions to which juveniles are subject in adult correctional institutions,14 0
and to the misuse of psychotropic medications in juvenile facilities.14 1 Most
of this literature looks carefully at the CRC;14 2 other international treaties,
conventions, and rules are also considered.14 3 But, to date, none has looked
at the CRPD.'"
137. See, e.g., Lisa Pearlstein, Note, Walking the Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using
International Legal Standards to Serve the Best Interests of Juvenile Offenders and Victims, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 109 (2010).
138. See, e.g., Jelani Jefferson & John W. Head, In Whose "Best Interests "?-An International and
Comparative Assessment of US Rules on Sentencing ofJuveniles, I HUM. RTs. & GLOBALIZATION L.
REv. 89 (2007-2008); Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40
COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 79 (2008); Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. PA. J. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 285 (2012); Yun, supra note 117, at 735-36.
139. See, e.g., Christina Okereke, Note, The Abuse of Girls in U.S. Juvenile Detention Facilities:
Why the United States Should Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Establish a National
Ombudsman for Children's Rights, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1709 (2007).
140. See, e.g., Andrea Wood, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with
Adults After Graham and Miller, 61 EMoRY L.J. 1445 (2012).
141. See Burton, supra note 92.
142. See, e.g., Millich, supra note 114, at 37; Moriearty & Carson, supra note 114, at 299;
Chandler, supra note 126, at 117 n.2; Okereke, supra note 139, at 1710-13.
143. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 92, at 468-71; Levick et al., supra note 138, at 318; David Sloss,
Legislating Human Rights: The Case for Federal Legislation to Facilitate Domestic Judicial Application
of International Human Rights Treaties, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 445, 452-54 (2012). Professors
Jefferson and Head discuss a wide range of international human rights law documents in this context,
including, in addition to the ICCPR and the JDL, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
(the "Beijing Rules"), and the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (commonly
called the "Riyadh Guidelines"). Jefferson & Head, supra note 138, at 101-02, 111-16.
144. There has traditionally been robust literature about the relationship between adult correctional
facilities and international human rights law. See, e.g., Alvin J. Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, The
International Context of U.S. Prison Reform: Using International Human Rights Laws and Standards
for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811, 814-15 (2004); Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary:
Mental lliness and Prison Rules, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 405-10 (2006); Sara A. Rodriguez,
The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners in Europe and the United States, 33 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 61, 62 (2007). However, in an article that I co-authored in 2009, I noted that there had
heretofore "been no scholarly literature on the question of the implications of the CRPD on the state of
prisoners' rights law in a U.S. domestic context." See Perlin & Dlugacz, supra note 119, at 677. Since
that time, several scholars have raised that issue in the context of adults. See, e.g., Janet E. Lord, Shared
Understanding or Consensus-Masked Disagreement? The Anti-Torture Framework in the Convention
on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 33 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 59-64 (2010); Beth
Ribet, Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
The Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented Advocacy, 17 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 281, 313-16 (2010); Kathryn D. DeMarco, Note, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on
the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities and Its Impact on the Use ofSupermax Solitary Confinement, 66
U. MIAMI L. REv. 523, 541-44 (2012). But only one article has discussed both juvenile detention issues
and the CRPD, and that article did not discuss them in the same context. See Johanna Kalb, Human
Rights Treaties in State Courts: The International Prospects of State Constitutionalism After Medellin,
115 PENN ST. L. REv. 1051, 1063-65 (2011). On the related question of the implications of the
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D. The CRPDI45
1. Introduction1 46
The CRPD "is regarded as having finally empowered the 'world's
largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in international and
national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved specific
treaty recognition and protection."l 47  This Convention is the most
revolutionary international human rights document that applies to persons
with disabilities ever created.14 8  As noted in its Introduction, the Disability
Convention "furthers the human rights approach to disability and
recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in" almost every
aspect of life.149 It firmly endorses a social model of disability-a clear and
direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part and
parcel of mental disability law. 5 0  "The Convention responds to traditional
models, situates disability within a social model framework and sketches
the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a
restorative justice model for juvenile justice with regard to international human rights, see Violet Odala,
The Spectrum for Child Justice in the International Human Rights Framework: From "Reclaiming the
Delinquent Child" to Restorative Justice, 27 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 543 (2012).
145. See PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE
SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 16, at 143-59; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law
and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: VISION, PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 98 (Michael Dudley et al eds., 2012); Perlin, "A Change is
Gonna Come": The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, supra note 16.
146. Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden ": Mental Health Courts, the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds.,
2013) (describing generally the CRPD); Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between
International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot eds.,
2013).
147. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.17 (2008) (footnotes omitted)
("See, for example, statements made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, and
the Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive
and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of
Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, convened by the UN Human Rights Council.").
148. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability
Law, supra note 16, at 3-21 (stating "disability was seen only as a medical problem of the individual
requiring a treatment or cure"); Perlin & Szeli, supra note 145.
149. Michael Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection
Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, supra note 17, at 139
(2011); see supra text accompanying notes 17-23; e.g., Dhir, supra note 17.
150. See Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between
International Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, supra notel 7 at 139.
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particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities."' 5 ' It
provides a framework for ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize
the rights of those with mental illness."' 5 2 There is no question that it "has
ushered in a new era of disability rights policy."' 53
It describes disability as a condition arising from "interaction with
various barriers [that] may hinder their full and effective participation in
society on an equal basis with others" instead of inherent limitations,154
reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights,'" and "extends
existing human rights to take into account the specific rights experience of
persons with disabilit[ies]."l56 Again, as noted in the Introduction,'57 it calls
for "[r]espect for inherent dignity"' 58 and "[n]on-discrimination."l 59
Subsequent articles declare "[flreedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,"1 60  "[flreedom from exploitation,
violence and abuse," 6'I and a right to protection of the "integrity of the
person."1 62
The CRPD is unique because it is the first legally binding instrument
devoted to the comprehensive protection of the rights of persons with
disabilities. It not only clarifies that states should not discriminate against
persons with disabilities, but it also explicitly sets out the many steps that
states must take to create an enabling environment so that persons with
disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in society.163  One of the most
151. Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 (2009); see, e.g., H. Archibald
Kaiser, Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State, 17 HEALTH
L.J. 139, 162 (2009); Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons from the Experience of
UN. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in
Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564 (2010); see also Ronald McCallum, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections (2010), available at
http://ssm.com/Abstract-1 563883.
152. Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW IN
CONTEXT, Dec. 2008, at 1, 8.
153. Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. REv. 1271, 1295 (2011).
154. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, supra note 18, art. I and pmbl., E.
155. Phil Fennell, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L. 95, 106-07 (2008).
156. Frid6ric M6gret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494,494 (2008); see PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 16, at 143-58.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
158. Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, supra note 18, art. 17.
159. Id. art. 3(B).
160. Id art. 15.
161. Id. art. 16.
162. Id art. 17.
163. See Bryan Y. Lee, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its
Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with Developmental Disabilities, 44 COLUM.
J.L. & SoC'L PROBS. 393 (2011) (discussing the changes that ratifying states need to make in their
domestic involuntary civil commitment laws to comply with Convention mandates); see also Istvin
Hoffman & Gyorgy Kbnczei, Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of
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critical issues in seeking to bring life to international human rights law in a
mental disability-law context is the right to adequate and dedicated counsel.
The CRPD mandates that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require
in exercising their legal capacity." M Elsewhere, the convention commands
"[t]he extent to which this Article is honored in signatory nations will have
a major impact on the extent to which this entire Convention affects persons
with mental disabilities." If, and only if, there is a mechanism for the
appointment of dedicated counsel can this dream become a reality. 166
The ratification of the CRPD marks the most important development
ever seen in institutional human rights law for persons with mental
disabilities. The CRPD is detailed, comprehensive, integrated, and the
result of a careful drafting process. It seeks to reverse the results of
centuries of oppressive behavior and attitudes that have stigmatized persons
with disabilities. Its goal is clear: to promote, protect, and ensure the full
and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
persons with disabilities and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.167
Whether this will actually happen is still far from a settled matter.
2. The Key Articles
Article 7 of the CRPD sets out the basic law that applies to children:
1. States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full
enjoyment by children with disabilities of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children.
2. In all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration.
3. States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the
right to express their views freely on all matters affecting them, their
views being given due weight in accordance with their age and
Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 143 (2010) (discussing the application of the CRPD to capacity issues); DeMarco, supra
note 144 (discussing the application of the CRPD to solitary confinement in correctional institutions).
164. See Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial":
Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 241, 252-53 (2008) (quoting Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note
18, art. 12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. at 253.
166. See Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Book Review: Cause
Lawyering for People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1658 (2010) (book review) (discussing the
significance of "cause lawyers" in the development of mental disability law in the United States).
167. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 18, art. 1.
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maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be provided
with disability and age-appropriate assistance to realize that right.'6 8
In a later article-one that focuses on "[fjreedom from exploitation,
violence and abuse"-this requirement is added: "States Parties shall put in
place effective legislation and policies, including women- and child-focused
legislation and policies, to ensure that instances of exploitation, violence
and abuse against persons with disabilities are identified, investigated and,
where appropriate, prosecuted."l 69
Subsequently, the CRPD also requires that States Parties shall
"[p]rovide those health services needed by persons with disabilities
specifically because of their disabilities, including early identification and
intervention as appropriate, and services designed to minimize and prevent
further disabilities, including among children .... It also, as part of its
command for access to justice, requires that "States Parties shall promote
appropriate training for those working in the field of administration of
justice, including police and prison staff.""'7 In an important article about
the relationship of the CRPD to prison conditions, Janet Lord also focuses
on Article 15, the right to "freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."' 72 Lord notes that "conditions within
prisons and other institutional settings have long been the subject of
scrutiny by disability organizations."l173 In another important piece, Beth
Ribet considers how the CRPD acknowledges "the disproportionate
vulnerability of people with disabilities to violence, and conceives of this
problem as within the terrain of disability human rights," 74 looking, inter
alia, at Article 15 as well.
3. Juveniles in Detention and the CRPD
Think again about what was discussed in Parts I and II of this Article.
At least two-thirds of all incarcerated juveniles have a mental disorder. 75
The disorder rate for female detainees and inmates is significantly higher
than for males.'76 Minorities are "disproportionately" locked up in juvenile
168. Id. art. 7.
169. Id. art. 16(5).
170. Id. art. 25(b).
171. Id. art. 13(2).
172. Id. art. 15.
173. Lord, supra note 144, at 69.
174. Ribet, supra note 144, at 315.
175. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, supra note 32, at 1137; see
sources cited supra note 32.
176. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, supra note 32, at 1138
("Females had higher rates than males of many psychiatric disorders, including major depressive
episode[s and] some anxiety disorders.").
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detention facilities.'77 In institutions, staff beatings of inmates, the use of
medications for social control purposes, extensive reliance on solitary
confinement, and a virtual absence of meaningful rehabilitative programs
are all common.'7 8  Much of the "treatment" that is offered is per se anti-
therapeutic.17 9 Worst of all, juveniles who are incarcerated in adult prisons
following the transfer or waiver process are far more likely to be sexually
assaulted or beaten by staff,180 and these conditions are exacerbated in the
cases of youths with mental disorders.'8'
V. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE' 82
A. Introduction
One of the most important theoretical legal developments of the past
two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic
jurisprudence (sometimes "TJ").'83  Initially employed in cases involving
individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently expanded far beyond
that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for
assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a
therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences.184  The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to
177. Birckhead, supra note 50, at 448; Corbit, supra note 38, at 76.
178. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II: Race and the "Crack Down" on
Youth Crime, supra note 89, at 378-79; see also Caldwell, Punishment v. Restoration: A Comparative
Analysis ofJuvenile Delinquency Law in the United States and Mexico, supra note 14, at 134.
179. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 90, at 1011-12; Burton, supra note 92, at 512.
180. Soler, supra note 85, at 323, 327; Geary, supra note 111, at 700; see also Levick et al., supra
note 138, at 307; Wood, supra note 140, at 1453.
181. Geary, supra note 111, at 700.
182. See generally Perlin, "John Brown Went Off to War": Considering Veterans' Courts as
Problem-Solving Courts, supra note 41; Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the
Mind": The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
Guardianship Law, supra note 21, at 1176-79 (discussing the impact that the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Mental Disabilities will have on international human rights law); Perlin, "There Are No
Trials Inside the Gates of Eden ": Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 146 (discussing the
relation of human rights and dignity in mental health law).
183. See David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 18
(2008). Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in
1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32-33 (1992); see generally DAVID B. WEXLER,
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990) (examining therapeutic
aspects of the law through various methods); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996) (discussing therapeutic
jurisprudence through several articles); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005) (offering a new model of commitment that balances protecting legal
rights and meeting clinical needs).
184. See Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAw 91 (lan Freckelton & Kerry Petersen eds., 2006) (for a
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determine whether legal "rules, procedures, and [lawyer] roles can or
should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles." 85  There is an inherent tension in
this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved:
the law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic
functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns." 8  As I have written
elsewhere, "[A]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that
therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."l87
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts
people's lives" and "focuses on the law's [influence] on emotional life and
psychological well-being."' 88  It suggests that "law should value psycho-
logical health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic
consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values
served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."'8 9
Therapeutic jurisprudence understands that, "when attorneys fail to
transnational perspective); Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill ": How
Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885,
912 (2009).
185. See Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got":
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735,
751 (2005); Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the
Sexual Autonomy Rights ofPersons Institutionalized Because ofMental Disability in Forensic Hospitals
and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 509 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and
Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 683, 719 (2003). Therapeutic jurisprudence
"might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of 'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist
fagade." See Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price
and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585-86 (2008); Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look
Inside Your Mirror": The Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental
Disabilities, 69 U. Prrr. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) (quoting PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL, supra note 106, at 301); see also Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice
and Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School
Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 561, 599 n.1 11 (2005) (citing Perlin, "You Have
Discussed Lepers and Crooks ": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra). Sanism is an irrational prejudice
of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in)
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. See Michael L. Perlin, On
"Sanism", 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 374-75 (1992).
186. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions ofLegal Scholarship,
11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also, e.g., David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5
APPLIED & PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 182 (1996) (explaining that their right to refuse treatment
encourages therapists to respect the dignity and autonomy of patients).
187. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. Perlin,
"Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us"
and "Them", 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
188. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims
of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009); David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Psycholegalogical Soft Spots and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION].
189. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL
COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
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acknowledge their clients' negative emotional reactions to the judicial
process, the clients are inclined to regard the lawyer as indifferent and a part
of a criminal system bent on punishment."'90 By way of example,
therapeutic jurisprudence "aims to offer social science evidence that limits
the use of the incompetency label by narrowly defining its use and
minimizing its psychological and social disadvantage."' 9 '
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through
a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of
mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure,
employment law, gay rights law, and tort law.19 2 As Ian Freckelton has
noted, "it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing
socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications."' 93 It is also
part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing
more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues
collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully.19 4  These alternative
approaches optimize the psychological well-being of individuals,
relationships, and communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. In
its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote
well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as ". . . a sea-
change in ethical thinking about the role of law ... a movement towards a
more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law ... which
emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism." 95 That
is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.19 6
190. Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know the
Immigration Consequences ofPlea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 47, 59 (2010).
191. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003). Christopher Slobogin
wrote the most thoughtful, sympathetic critique of therapeutic jurisprudence. See generally Christopher
Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193
(1995) (finding and examining problems confronting therapeutic jurisprudence).
192. See Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental
Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 537 (2002-2003).
193. Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and
Risks ofInfluence, supra note 185, at 576.
194. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law
Movement, in LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION, supra note 188, at 465.
195. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J. MED.
& L. 328, 329-30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement:
Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A
HEALING PROFESSION 341, 342 (Maijorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The
Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law
Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06 (2006). The use of the phrase was coined by Carol Gilligan.
See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing how men and women make decisions about morality).
196. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic"
Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006);
Brookbanks, supra note 195; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate
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One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a
commitment to dignity.'97 Professor Amy Ronner describes "the three Vs":
voice, validation, and voluntariness,198 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense
of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant
feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously
the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they
are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense
of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the
proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered
the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives
can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at
least participating in, their own decisions.199
The question to be addressed here is this: Given the system of juvenile
punishment that is currently in place, is it remotely possible that Professor
Ronner's vision-of voice, voluntariness, and validation-will be fulfilled?
B. The Juvenile System
Could there be any system that is less consonant with Professor
Ronner's values,2 00 less consonant with the ethos and esprit of therapeutic
jurisprudence than the current system of incarcerating juveniles, especially
those with mental disabilities? There is no evidence whatsoever that
anything about the system is "voluntary." Professor Burton's article about
the overuse and the misuse of antipsychotic medications201 illuminates how
one discrete area of mental disability law-one that generally, at least on
(Many of) Professor Quinn's Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering,
48 B.C. L. REv. 597, 599 (2007); Winick & Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, supra note 195, at 605-07.
197. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161
(2005).
198. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 ToURo L. REv. 601, 627 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and
Misrepresented: The Price and Risks ofInfluence, supra note 185, at 587-88 (discussing the importance
of voice).
199. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95 (2002) (footnotes omitted); see
generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
200. See Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, supra note 199, at 102-13 (discussing how the Miranda waiver
system fails under therapeutic jurisprudence standards).
201. See Burton, supra note 92.
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paper, acknowledges that there are critical differences between the
voluntary and involuntary administration of such medications, 202 and one in
which, in both civil and forensic mental disability law, comprehensive and
elaborate constitutional doctrines of right-to-refuse medication have been
articulated2 03 l-has had virtually no impact whatsoever on what is regularly
done in juvenile facilities.
There is no evidence that juveniles have any "voice" in their treatment
or as to the conditions of their confinement. There is no evidence that
juveniles in this system are "validated" in any way. The "shock[] the
conscience"204 level of conditions reported in Professor Abrams's article2 05
-conditions that sound Gulag-like in their level of repression-are as anti-
therapeutic as one could conjure.
Subjecting juveniles with mental disabilities to sexual assaults,20 6
environments that spike suicide rates, 207and incarceration with adults 20 8
speaks to conditions that, again, are anti-therapeutic per se, 2 09 and reflect
the reality that, by and large, there has been very little penetration of
therapeutic jurisprudence concepts and principles into the "on the ground"
practice of juvenile justice in a criminal law setting. Certainly, the
incompetency and insanity procedures-as applied to juveniles-do not
provide this.210
Certainly, there are examples of court systems that have made use of
the theories and practices of therapeutic jurisprudence in "attempts to
202. See PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 66, ch. 3B, at 153-
385.
203. See also Michael L. Perlin, "They Keep It All Hid": The Ghettoization of Mental Disability
Law and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 857-59 nn.2-3 (2010)
(discussing mental disability law and the lack of impact it has had on procedures conducted in juvenile
facilities). Compare, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177-80 (2003) (discussing doctrines
relating to persons incompetent to stand trial), with Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-36 (1992)
(discussing doctrines relating to competent insanity pleaders), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
213-18 (1990) (discussing doctrines relating to prisoner cases), and Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,
341-44 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing doctrines relating to civil cases).
204. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (finding that a forced stomach pumping
procedure to retract pills swallowed by a defendant "shocks the conscience," and thus, violates due
process).
205. See Abrams, supra note 90, at 1046-49.
206. See Geary, supra note 111, at 700.
207. See Corbit, supra note 38, at 82.
208. See Geary, supra note 111, at 700.
209. See generally Birgden & Perlin, "Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked":
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to Prisoners and Detainees
by Forensic Psychologists, supra note 119; Birgden & Perlin, "Where the Home in the Valley Meets the
Damp Dirty Prison": A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of
Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Settings, supra note 119 (discussing the relationship between
therapeutic jurisprudence and correctional systems in general).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 56-74.
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balance punishment, prevention, and adjudication." 211 Therapeutic
jurisprudence's use of positive reinforcement in the juvenile parole
revocation process is a "basic psychological principle that should be
imported into the legal system." 2 12 Scholars and clinicians have urged that
a comprehensive approach in dealing with juveniles with mental illness in
this context-a pathway from an assessment center, to a detention center
with treatment planning, to a mental health court, to a court order for
community-based services-would best "allow the juvenile courts to
embrace the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence."2 13
And there have been some scholarly explorations. In a thoughtful
article, Professor Grisso and Richard Barnum apply therapeutic
jurisprudence concepts to the juvenile competence-to-stand-trial process. 2 14
Professor Bruce Winick and Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren have articulated the
therapeutic jurisprudence foundations of a right to counsel on behalf of
juveniles facing civil commitment.215 Other scholars have incorporated
therapeutic jurisprudence precepts into articles and essays on a full range of
issues dealing with juvenile detention and juvenile justice.2 16 But these are,
by and large, exceptions, and by no means do they dominate the discourse
in this area of law and policy.
In three recent books, I have explored the relationships between
therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights, between
therapeutic jurisprudence and the death penalty, and between therapeutic
jurisprudence and criminal procedure.217 In these works, I concluded that it
was impossible to make any meaningful headway in the resolution of the
difficult, seemingly intractable issues that have emerged in all of these areas
211. See Marsha B. Freeman, Florida Collaborative Family Law: The Good, the Bad, and the
(Hopefully) Getting Better, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 237, 253 (2010); see also Nolen, supra note 56, at
210-18 (discussing the therapeutic jurisprudence basis of special drug courts for juveniles).
212. Jennifer Marie Sanchez, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Due Process in the Juvenile Parole
Revocation Process: An Arizona Illustration, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 111, 119 (2005).
213. Gene Griffin & Michael J. Jenuwine, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Bridge the Juvenile
Justice and Mental Health Systems, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 65, 86 (2002); see Buffington-Vollum, supra
note 43, at 242 (discussing the failure to provide diversion programs); see also Geary, supra note 111, at
693-706 (characterizing this plan as "effective" and providing recommendations for juvenile mental
health detention systems that are consonant with therapeutic jurisprudence values).
214. Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court in
Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
321, 321-24 (1994).
215. Bruce J. Winick & Ginger Lemer-Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil Commitment Have a Right
to Counsel?: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 115, 115-18 (2002). The Florida
courts followed their advice. See Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350,
804 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 2001).
216. See A.J. Stephani, Symposium: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Children, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
13, 15 n.8 (2002).
217. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013); PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 16; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES (2013).
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of the law without carefully considering the therapeutic jurisprudence
implications of the actions of judges, legislators, lawyers, and other
policymakers.218 The same arguments could be made in any therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis of the questions I am addressing in this paper.
C. The Special Issues Related to Counsel
Another issue to be considered through the therapeutic jurisprudence
lens is the appointment of counsel to the cohort of juveniles in question.2 19
Professor Grisso is clear that "[i]f there is a single most important
obligation of the system for protecting the legal interests of youths with
mental disorders, it is the obligation to provide them with competent
defense attorneys .... 220
These issues are especially exacerbated in juvenile cases where the
person facing institutionalization rarely, if ever, has the funds to retain a
lawyer of his or her own choice. The disparity between quality of counsel
in jurisdictions in which there is an organized public defender system and in
which there is none is well known.22 1 Certainly, the quality of
representation available to juveniles in jurisdictions without such a system
fails miserably under any therapeutic jurisprudence metric. The issues are
218. See generally PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 217, at 217-39; PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
MENAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 16, at 203-18 (exploring the
relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and international human rights); PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES, supra note 217, at 147-55.
219. See Donald N. Duquette & Julian Darwell, Child Representation in America: Progress Report
from the National Quality Improvement Center, 46 FAM. L. Q. 87, 88-122 (2012) (discussing questions
related to the appointment of counsel to juveniles in the family law system); see also David Katner,
Revising Legal Ethics in Delinquency Cases by Consulting with Juveniles'Parents, 79 UMKC L. REV.
595, 595-632 (2011) (discussing the related issue of the ethical implications of consulting with the
parents of a juvenile in delinquency proceedings).
220. THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 32, at 177; see also Gary Crippen, Can the
Courts Fairly Account for the Diminished Competence and Culpability of Juveniles? A Judge's
Perspective, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
37, at 403, 408-09; Shana Conklin, Note, Juveniles Locked in Limbo: Why Pretrial Detention Implicates
a Fundamental Right, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2150, 2150-81 (2012) (discussing how pretrial detention
implicates fundamental rights); Amy Webbink, Note, Access Denied: Incarcerated Juveniles and Their
Right ofAccess to Courts, 7 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 613, 613-42 (1999) (discussing the question of the
need of incarcerated juveniles for counsel in matters related to their conditions).
221. See Junius Allison, Relationship Between the Office of the Public Defender and the Assigned
Counsel System, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 399, 399-422 (1976) (discussing an earlier perspective); Thomas
H. Cohen, Who's Better at Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of
Producing Favorable Case Outcomes, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid
=1876474 (discussing how defendants with assigned counsel receive less favorable outcomes compared
to their counterparts with public defenders; the author is a statistician, with the United States Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
336 [Vol. 46:301
2013] "YONDER STANDS YOUR ORPHAN WITH HIS GUN"
also similarly exacerbated because of juveniles' unique developmental
status.222
In my discussion of the CRPD above,223 I focused on issues related to
the right to counsel.224 Again, in both books and law review articles, I have
stressed the importance of access to dedicated and organized counsel
systems if the CRPD is to be more than a "paper victory" for persons with
disabilities.22 5 Professor Ronner and Judge Juan Ramirez characterize the
right to counsel as "the core of therapeutic jurisprudence,"22 6 and I have
previously argued that "[t]he failure to assign adequate counsel bespeaks
... a failure to consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence." 2 27
But virtually none of the scholarly literature or commentary applies to the
plight of the incarcerated juvenile with mental disabilities. It is time we
focus on this population.
VI. CONCLUSION
Juvenile punishment and incarceration schemes are morally bereft.
They subject the most at-risk population to unspeakably brutal conditions,
they ignore the ubiquity of mental disabilities in this population, and they
provide few meaningful diversion programs. These calamities are
exacerbated when questions of race, gender, and family cohesion are the
subject of focus. Our policies of transfer and waiver and the way that the
criminal justice system treats questions of incompetency, insanity, and
228 ce iltMiranda waiver further exacerbate the situation. Our policies violate
international law, deny individuals the dignity which they are due, and turn
their backs on the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence. In an article
222. See Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure Juveniles a
Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 175,
205 (2007) (discussing impact ofjuveniles' "cognitive disadvantages").
223. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
224. See, e.g., PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE
SILENCED ARE HEARD, supra note 16, at 159-67.
225. See Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll Find Out When You
Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C)
Anything More Than "Idiot Wind? ", 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) ("Mental disability law
is strewn with examples of 'paper victories."' (quoting Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard
Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds.,
1976))).
226. Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville 's Tribute to the Sixth
Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004).
227. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and
Significance ofCounsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, supra note 185, at 750; see also Perlmutter,
supra note 185, at 579 n.53 (citing sources that consider other juvenile justice questions from
therapeutic jurisprudence perspectives).
228. Many thoughtful recommendations have been made, but there has been, in many jurisdictions,
absolutely no positive response. See, e.g., Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 483, 538-41 (2009).
337
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
critiquing the incompetency-to-stand-trial process, I characterized mental
disability law in this context as a "fraud and charade." 2  I would apply the
same, precise words to the system under consideration in this paper.
Oliver Trager refers to "It's All Over Now, Baby Blue" (the song on
which I drew for my title) as depicting "a cold world in which nothing is
certain" but one that "still brims with a kind of dark hope." 230 The world of
juveniles that I have depicted is "cold," and little, if anything, is "certain."
But I retain some "hope"-albeit "dark hope"-that if we begin to take
seriously the principles of international human rights law and therapeutic
jurisprudence, our "orphan with his gun" may finally have a world that is a
better place. For all of us.
229. Michael L. Perlin, "Everything's a Little Upside Down, As a Matter of Fact the Wheels Have
Stopped": The Fraudulence of the Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 239,240 (2004).
230. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 320
(2004).
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